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Special Comment
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION IN KENTUCKY:
PART I - HOMICIDE AND ASSAULT
By ROBERT C. LAWSON*
INTRODUCTION
Whatever views one holds about the penal law, no one
will question its importance in society. This is the law on
which men place their ultimate reliance for protection against
all the deepest injuries that human conduct can inflict on
individuals and institutions. By the same token, penal law
governs the strongest force that we permit official agencies
to bring to bear on individuals. Its promise as an instrument of
safety is matched only by its power to destroy. If penal
law is weak or ineffective, basic human interests are in
jeopardy. If it is harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works a
gross injustice on those caught within its toils. The law that
carries such responsibilities should surely be as rational and
just as law can be. Nowhere in the entire legal field is more
at stake for the community or for the individual.'
At the present time the Kentucky Commission on Law En-
forcement and Crime Prevention and the Legislative Research
Commission are jointly engaged in a project designed to revise
the state's substantive criminal law. This effort is justifiable only
if the existing law is defective and the "revision will result in
significant improvement in [criminal law] administration."2 A
cursory examination of the criminal statutes, with no reference to
case law, leaves not the slightest doubt as to the need for revision.
Until now no major attempt at revision has ever been undertaken
in this state. As a consequence, the statutes are devoid of organ-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to
recognize the assistance of David Boswell and Thomas Russell, third year law
students at the University of Kentucky, in the research for this article.
I Wechler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 H1Av. L. lEzv. 1097,
1098 (1952).2 Remington, Ciminal Law Revision, Codification v. Piecemeal Amendment,
3 NaB. L. Izv. 396, 397 (1954).
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ization, haphazard in their coverage, with overlaps in some areas
and gaps in others, and totally lacking in unifying ideas. For
most of the major offenses, such as robbery,3 murder4 and man-
slaughter,' the statutes do no more than establish sanctions. The
difficult task of defining the crimes is left to the judiciary. With
respect to the important general doctrines of criminal law, such
as mens rea, causation, intoxication, complicity, and justification,
the statutes hardly make mention. As a consequence of the com-
bined effect of these deficiencies, the statutes are nearly impos-
sible to comprehend and literally engulfed with uncertainty of
application. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, the
possibility of inequitable treatment among offenders engaging
in similar conduct with similar mental states exists in almost
every major classification of offense.
The task of revision must begin with a statement of existing
principles and an identification and analysis of their deficiencies.
It is toward this end that this article is directed. The selection
of homicide and assault (bodily injury offenses) as subject matter
is not solely, or even principally, because of the importance of
these offenses to criminal jurisprudence. Rather it is because this
subject matter, better than any other, serves to demonstrate
vividly all of the following: (1) The evils that result from a piece-
meal, patchwork enactment of criminal laws; (2) the need to
eliminate obsolete offenses and useless distinctions that serve no
purpose in separating criminal from non-criminal behavior; (3)
the need to provide clarity and understanding to common law
principles through codification; and (4) the advantages to the
bench, bar and to society of a cohesive, well-defined code that
describes criminal offenses by use of principles having broad,
general application.
I. HoMIcDE
A. Introduction
The statutory portion of Kentucky's law of homicide may be
divided into two parts. The first consists of three statutes which
provide for the crimes of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
3 Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 433.120(1) (1942).
4KRS § 435.010 (1942).
5KRS § 435.020 (1942); KRS § 435.022 (1962).
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involuntary manslaughter in the first and second degrees. Two
of the three serve only to provide penalties for the common law
offenses of murder and voluntary manslaughter. The third pro-
vides penalties for the two degrees of involuntary manslaughter
and, in addition, attempts to describe the types of conduct con-
stituting this offense. The second part consists of several statutes
which denominate as murder, or a lesser homicide offense, the
killing of a human being under some specially described cir-
cumstances. The limited application of each of these statutes
is revealed by its title:
1. KRS 435.025-Death occurring as result of negligently
operating motor vehicle (twelve months in county jail).
2. KRS 435.030-Homicide occurring in course of criminal
syndicalism or sedition (life imprisonment or death).
3. KRS 435.040-Homicide occurring in course of abortion
(two to twenty-one years or life or death).
4. KRS 435.050-Homicide occurring in course of stabbing,
striking or shooting (one to six years).
5. KRS 435.060-Homicide or injury resulting from obstruc-
tion of road (life imprisonment or death).
6. KRS 435.070-Lynching or mob violence (life imprison-
ment or death).
7. KRS 435.190-Reckless shooting or throwing of missile
into train, station, steamboat or motor vehicle (life
imprisonment or death).
8. KRS 433.390-Displacing or damaging railroad track,
switch or bridge (life imprisonment or death).
The role of these "special" statutory offenses must be considered
as a preliminary matter to any thoughtful analysis of the need for
revising the law of homicide.
The major infirmity of Kentucky's criminal law is the "pro-
liferation of offenses or distinctions with respect to sentence un-
supported by principled rationale."6 The "special" offenses exist-
ing in every category of crime are solely responsible for this in-
firmity, the consequences of which may be demonstrated by use
of the following hypothetical situations:
6MovELr PENAL ComE § 201.4, Comment 55 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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D-1, with no intention of D-2, with no intention of
causing death, shoots into an vs. causing death, shoots into a
occupied motor vehicle and crowd of people and causes
causes the death of V-1. the death of V-2.
By all rational standards of measurement the criminal culpability
of D-1 is indistinguishable from that of D-2. Neither of the two
consciously desired to cause anyone's death; each committed an
act having an extremely high and unjustifiable risk of death; and
each must have consciously disregarded that risk. Nevertheless,
under existing homicide principles the two defendants would be
afforded substantially different treatment. D-1 would be con-
victed under KRS 435.190, a "speciar homicide offense, and
punished to the extent of life imprisonment or death. D-2, in the
absence of a "speciar statute to punish his conduct, would be
convicted under a "generar' homicide statute, most likely the one
defining involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, and
punished by confinement in a penitentiary for no more than
fifteen years. A more grotesque consequence of the "special"
crimes may be shown by comparing the treatment accorded the
two defendants in the following situations:
D-8, intending to injure but D-4, intending to injure but
not kill, shoots at V-3 but vs. not kill, shoots at V-4 and
misses his target completely. causes an injury from which
V-4 dies.
Once again the culpable mental states of the two offenders are
identical. Only the consequences of their acts are different, with
D-3's causing no actual harm and D-4"s causing the death of an
innocent person. Under existing principles, D-3 would be prose-
cuted for malicious shooting without wounding, a "generar'
offense, and assessed a term of imprisonment from two to
twenty-one years. D-4, who acted with an identical intent and
caused a much greater harm, would be prosecuted under KRS
435.050, one of the "speciar' homicide statutes, and punished
by imprisonment from one to six years.
Differences in punitive sanctions without correlation to rele-
vant differences in the criminal nature of conduct, exemplified
by those of the preceding paragraph, are abundant in every
class of crime. Such differences inevitably result in inequities
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and injustice and must be eliminated if the criminal law is to be
"as rational and just as law can be."7 Their elimination from the
law of homicide can be achieved by fully and comprehensively
defining the offenses of murder, voluntary manslaughter, involun-
tary manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Once this change is
made, the "special" homicide offenses have no functional value
and can be eliminated without difficulty.
B. Murder
Introduction: The American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code provides for two instances in which criminal homicide
constitutes murder: (1) When it is committed purposely or
knowingly; and (2) when it is committed recklessly under cir-
cumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life.8 The first involves a homicide resulting from conduct
of an actor whose conscious objective is to cause the death of
another. The second involves an "unintentional" homicide (i.e.,
no conscious desire to cause death) resulting from conduct
which possesses a risk of death so substantial and unjustifiable
as to reflect an indifference to human life indistinguishable from
the indifference reflected by homicides committed "intentionally."
Used in every major revision of criminal law that has occurred in
recent years, this serves as an excellent frame of reference for a
discussion of Kentucky's approach to the offense.
Our entire legislative contribution to the law of murder is
contained in this provision: "Any person who commits willful
murder shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary
for life, or by death."9 No attempt has been made to describe
by statute the types of conduct punishable under this provision.
That responsibility has been left to the Court of Appeals, and
satisfied through the creation of several distinct types of "mur-
der": (a) intentional murder; (b) killing of a police officer;
(c) negligent murder; and (d) felony murder. All are in sub-
stantial need of revision.
Intentional Murder: Essential to the commission of this type
of murder are only two elements, intent by a defendant to kill
7 Wechler, supra note 1.
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962).
9 KRS § 435.010 (1942).
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(naturally without excuse, justification, or mitigating circum-
stances) and death of a victim. Unessential to its commission is
an element of "malice," at least if used in the ordinary sense
of "ill will." Although fully accepting this description of the
crime, the Court of Appeals has persistently defined it as a
killing done willfully and with malice aforethought, and has
attached to these words the following meaning:
The word 'willful' ...means intentional, not accidental.
The phrase 'malice aforethought' means a predetermination
to do the act of killing without legal excuse, and it is im-
material how suddenly or recently before the killing such
determination was formed.10
With these definitions, this type of murder is limited to the
situation where a defendant consciously desires or intends to
cause the death of his victim.
Largely due to the requirement of "malice aforethought,"
this offense has not been as free of confusion as it should have
been. At times the courts have interpreted this phrase to mean
"ill will" and have attempted by judicial pronouncement to
supply the element when it has not existed in fact. The conse-
quences have been: (a) The development of such barren con-
cepts as "express malice," "implied malice" and "inferred malice;"
and (b) the confusion that is reflected in this statement by the
Court of Appeals:
The evidences of express malice, as well as the fact from
which malice may be implied, are easily recognized. Express
malice usually manifests itself in previous or contemporane-
ous threats by the wrongdoer of death or harm to his intended
victim, or declarations or acts indicative of his ill will toward,
or desire to inflict injury upon him. Implied malice is such
as arises or may be inferred from the intentional doing of an
unlawful or wrongful purpose. For example, the use by one
of a deadly weapon in the unlawful taldng or attempted
taking of human life, or in unlawful inflicting or intending to
inflict, upon another bodily injury, is an act from which malice
is implied or may be inferred. More broadly stated, malice
lo Combs v. Commonwealth, 112 S.W. 658, 660 (1908).
19701
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will be inferred from the intentional doing of any wrongful
act which the perpetrator knows will necessarily cause in-
jury to another, or which he intends shall cause injury to
another, though such injury may not in fact result."
The changes needed in this offense are not in its substance but
rather in the manner of its description. References to "malice
aforethought," "willful," and the various types of "malice," should
be eliminated and the offense defined so that triers of fact are
left to decide only whether a defendant, at the time of his act,
consciously desired to cause his victim's death.
Killing of a Police Officer: Except that the victims happened
to be police officers, the cases involving this type of murder are
indistinguishable from those of the preceding type. The origin
of this offense is traceable to the requirement of "malice afore-
thought" and a notion, now discarded, that such requirement
could be satisfied only by a showing of "ill-will." To supply this
element when it is otherwise unavailable, use has been made of
the victim's occupational status:
The officer is the minister of the law. He represents its ma-
jesty. His person is therefore clothed with a peculiar sanctity.
An assault upon him, when properly engaged in the execution
of his duty, is an assault upon the law; and if he be stricken
down at such time, as was ruthlessly done in this instance,
by one knowing him to be an officer, it is murder, although
the doer may not have any particular malice.12 (Emphasis
added).
In the case containing this quotation, death resulted intentionally,
i.e., the accused intended to kill his victim. A similar state of
mind can be found in all of the other cases of this type.'3 As a
consequence, this type of murder, as an independent basis of
criminal liability, has absolutely no functional value. No legiti-
mate purpose is served by having two separate offenses of murder,
the only difference between them being the occupational status
of the victims. If malice is deemed necessary for conviction, the
process of reasoning use for "intentional" murder is equally ap-
11Burns v. Commonwealth, 136 Ky. 468, 476-77, 124 S.W. 409, 412 (1910).
' 2Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550, 561, 11 S.W. 651, 653 (1889).
'13 See, e.g., Bircham v. Commonwealth, 288 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky. 1951); El-
liott v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 502, 161 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1941).
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plicable here. Malice can be inferred or implied from the in-
tentional doing of a homicidal act. However, as indicated above,
"malice," or "malice aforethought," should be eliminated as an
element of murder. Along with its elimination, the killing of a
police officer, as a distinct homicide offense, would also be
eliminated.
Negligent Murder: The descriptive label for this offense is
used to indicate nothing other than the absence of a desire on
the part of an actor to achieve the consequences of his act. To
be convicted of this offense, an accused must perform an act that
is extremely dangerous to human life and must perform it with
a conscious disregard of that danger. A typical case of this type
is Brown v. Commonwealth,4 one in which the accused, without
lawful reason, fired a gun into a crowded room and killed one
of its occupants. Even though the defendant had no desire to
kill, the Court of Appeals held his conduct sufficient for a murder
conviction. A second case involving conduct representative of
this crime is Hill v. Commonwealth.15 The accused in this case
intentionally shot into a motor vehicle knowing it to be occupied.
Once again this act was held to constitute murder even though
the accused had no intention of causing death. With this ruling
the Court of Appeals described the conduct constituting this
offense as an act committed "in a reckless manner and without
lawful excuse and without regard for human life."'6
A more significant aspect of the Hill case, however, was a deci-
sion that in cases of this type, jurors should be instructed on the
offense of voluntary manslaughterY7 The purpose of this ruling
was apparently to enable juries to assess lower sanctions than
are available for murder. For a conviction of this type of man-
slaughter, the death-causing conduct had to involve a great devia-
tion from the standard of reasonable behavior. That deviation was
most often described as "reckless and wanton carelessness.", 8
Labeled as "negligent voluntary manslaughter," this offense
caused immense confusion, principally because the Court of
Appeals failed to distinguish clearly between "gross negligence"
24 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 372, 17 S.W. 220 (1891).
35 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931).
36 Id. at 650, 40 S.W.2d at 261-62.
17 Accord Ewing v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 237, 111 S.W. 353 (1908).
18 See e g Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1961); Smith
v. Conmonwealt, 113 Ky. 532, 118 S.W. 368 (1909).
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(which sufficed for the offense of involuntary manslaughter) and
"wanton and reckless carelessness," occasionally used the terms
interchangeably,19 and, finally ruled that the standard for measur-
ing criminality of a defendant's conduct was dependent upon the
type of death-causing instrumentality used to commit the of-
fense. The latter was stated as follows:
As applied to fire arms and other deadly weapons it is some-
times said that their use must have been 'grossly careless or
grossly negligent' in order to constitute the crime of volun-
tary manslaughter. But as applied to an automobile or other
instrumentality which is dangerous to life only when im-
properly handled, the grade or degree of carelessness or negli-
gence is higher than those terms are ordinarily understood
to mean. So it has been generally declared to be necessary
to establish 'reckless and wanton carelessness.'20
Because of the confusion and difficulty that engulfed this offense
(negligent voluntary manslaughter), only one conclusion about it
can be made with certainty. It ultimately replaced in its entirety
the offense of negligent murder.
Then in 1962 the Kentucky legislature created the statutory
offenses of involuntary manslaughter in the first and second
degrees, using the term "wantonness" to describe the former and
"recklessness" to describe the latter 21 Following the creation of
these offenses, the Court of Appeals ruled that the crime of vol-
untary manslaughter could no longer be used to impose puni-
tive sanctions upon an individual who had "unintentionally"
caused the death of another.22 Homicides resulting from "wanton
or reckless" conduct, after this decision, had to be prosecuted
under the involuntary manslaughter statute. This is the present
state of the law, meaning that conduct which originally consti-
tuted negligent murder now constitutes involuntary manslaughter
in the first degree.
The issue to be faced in considering a revision of this
law is whether conduct containing the following elements is
19 See, Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 165 (1926).
20 Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 362, 364-65, 124 S.W.2d 486, 487
(1939)
21K'fRS § 435.022 (1962).
22 Hemphill v. Commonwealth, 379 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1964); Lambert v.
Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
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sufficient for a conviction of murder: (a) A substantial and un-
justifiable risk that death will occur; (b) a conscious disregard
of that risk by an actor; and (c) a gross deviation from conduct
that a reasonable person would observe. Stated differently, and
perhaps more meaningfully, the issue is whether to reinstate the
principles established by the Court of Appeals in Brown v. Com-
monwealth and Hill v. Commonwealth. An affirmative answer
to this question necessarily reflects a judgment that the culpable
mental state of a person who acts with extreme recklessness is not
significantly different from the culpable mental state of a person
who commits an intentional homicide. Such a judgment is re-
flected in the provisions of the Model Penal Code, 3 as well as
those of most recent criminal law revisions:
24
[T]here is a kind of reckless homicide that cannot fairly
be distinguished ... from homicides committed [intention-
ally]. Recklessness . . . pre-supposes an awareness of the
creation of substantial homicidal risk, a risk too great to be
deemed justifiable by any valid purpose that the actor's con-
duct serves. Since risk, however, is a matter of degree and the
motives for risk creation may be infinite in variation, some
formula is needed to identify the case where recklessness
should be assimilated to [intention]. The conception that
the draft employs is that of extreme indifference to the value
of human life. The significance of [intention] is that, cases of
provocation apart, it demonstrates precisely such indiffer-
ence.25 (Emphasis Added).
The soundness of this judgment would seem to demand rein-
statement of the offense once known as "negligent murder."
Felony Murder: The doctrine of "felony murder" is usually
described as follows:
Homicide is murder if the death ensues in consequence of
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of some other
felony unless such other felony was not dangerous of itself
23 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962).
24 E.g., ILLINOIS CRIfINAL CODE of 1961 § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); NEw
Yora PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney's 1967); PROPOSED DELAWARE CRiMINAL
CODE § 412 (Governor's Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law 1967);
PRoPOsED MxcmcIAN REVISED CRIMINAL CODE § 2006 (Special Committee of the
Michigan State Bar for the Revision of Criminal Code 1967).2 5MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment 29 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
1970]
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and the method of its perpetration or attempt did not appear
to involve any appreciable human risk.26
Its principal application has been to two types of cases, one
involving a death that is caused accidentally, the other involving
a death that results from an act of a felon other than the de-
fendant, i.e. one of his accomplices in the underlying felony.
In re-examining this doctrine, most of the new statutes have
made or proposed substantial changes in its substance. The
approaches of the New York Penal Law and the Model Penal
Code have been most influential.
Under the former, a death resulting during the commission of
a felony can form the basis of a conviction for murder of all the
participants in that felony.27 In the adoption of this approach,
some important limitations were attached to traditional felony
murder. For example, the homicide victim must be a non-partici-
pant in the underlying felony; and the death in issue must
occur in furtherance of, in the course, or in flight from, one of a
short list of specifically enumerated violent felonies.2 In addi-
tion, the New York statute provides a means by which a de-
fendant in a felony murder case may prove that he did not
possess sufficient culpability for a conviction of murder. By es-
tablishing affirmatively that he had nothing at all to do with
the homicidal act, was not armed, had no reason to believe any
other participant was armed, and had no reason to believe any
participant intended to engage in conduct likely to cause death
or serious injury, a defendant may relieve himself of responsi-
bility for the homicide.29
The approach of the Model Penal Code to felony murder
starts with this proposition:
[I]t is indefensible to use the sanctions that the law employs
to deal with murder, unless there is at least a finding that
the actor's conduct manifested an extreme indifference to
the value of human life.
30
26R. PxuXnNS, CnnniNAL LAw 36 (1957).
2 7 NEw YoRK PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney's 1967).
28 The offenses which bring the doctrine into operation are "robbery, burg-
lary, ddnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual
abuse in the first degree, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second
degree." Id.
29 NEw YoRx PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney's 1967).
30 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment 39 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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From this point, the Code converts the felony murder doctrine
into a principle of procedural law by creating a presumption that
is phrased something like this: If a homicide occurs during the
commission of, or escape from, robbery, forcible rape, arson, burg-
lary, kidnapping or felonious escape, it shall be presumed to
have been committed "recklessly under circumstances manifest-
ing extreme indifference to the value of human life."-1 (As indi-
cated earlier, recklessness of this degree is sufficient for a con-
viction of murder.) This presumption is clearly applicable to all
of the participants of the underlying felony. Its procedural func-
tion, however, is not clear. Apparently it is intended to impose
upon an accused the burden of persuading a jury that he was
not acting with "recklessness manifesting extreme indifference
to human life." Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the general
intent of the Code is clear. Before an accused can be convicted
of murder for a death resulting from commission of a felony,
his conduct in committing that felony must be found to have
constituted extreme recklessness toward human life.
A third approach to felony murder, preferable to the pre-
ceding ones, is like that of the Model Penal Code except that
no use is made of the Code's presumption. This change reflects a
judgment that the fact of a defendant's involvement in a felony
is an insufficient reason for altering the usual burden of proof
in a criminal case. The most significant accomplishment of this
approach is the abandonment of "felony-murder" as an inde-
pendent basis for establishing an offense of homicide. Criminal
responsibility for deaths occurring in the course of felonies are
measured, like all homicides, by use of general principles. If a
defendant's participation in a felony from which a death results
is found to constitute extreme recklessness manifesting indiffer-
ence to human life, he is guilty of murder; if found to constitute
recklessness not manifesting such indifference, he is guilty of
a lesser homicide offense. And if his participation is found to be
accompanied by no culpable mental state with respect to the
death, he is not guilty of a homicide offense. If adopted, how
would this approach affect existing law?
In answering this question, it is necessary to distinguish cases
which have incorrectly or unnecessarily applied the felony murder
3 1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1962).
1970]
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doctrine from those which have correctly applied it. Of the first
type, one of the earliest cases is Commonwealth v. Reddick.32
In this case, the accused burglarized and intentionally burned
a hotel. Three deaths occurred as a result of the fire. In affrming
a conviction of the defendant for murder, the Court of Appeals
relied upon the felony-murder doctrine. Despite the fact that this
death-causing act constituted an independent felony, reliance
on the doctrine in this situation was unnecessary. The act in-
volved in Reddick is indistinguishable from an act of shooting
into an occupied building or automobile without intent to kill,
which was sufficient under Kentucky law at the time of this
decision to constitute negligent murder. In other words, a homi-
cide like that in Reddick should be treated as murder not be-
cause a defendant's act is illegal (i.e., a felony) but rather be-
cause his act is "so extremely dangerous as to make it wantonly
disregardful of the lives of others."33 Another case that is fre-
quently but incorrectly cited as a felony murder decision is
Williams v. Commonwealth.'4 In this case the accused, acting
alone, shot and killed a person he was attempting to rob. All of
the evidence indicated an intentional killing. Yet, in describing
the type of jury instructions that should have been given, the
Court of Appeals said that a murder conviction is appropriate
if the act resulting in death is committed by a defendant while
attempting or intending to commit a robbery. Once again there
was no need to resort to the felony murder doctrine. An inten-
tional killing, without excuse, justification or mitigating circum-
stances, is murder without regard to the existence or non-exist-
ence of an independent felony.
After eliminating the cases which make an unnecessary use
of this doctrine, only three Kentucky cases are left.35 All three
have similar factual settings. In each case the underlying felony
was robbery, an offense which by nature is potentially dangerous
to human life. In each of the three the defendant had at least
32 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 1020, 33 S.W. 416 (1895). Accord Whitfield v. Common-
wealth, 278 Ky. 111, 128 S.W.2d 208 (1939) (the death in issue resulted from
arson of a building; however, the death was "unintentional").
33 Moreland, A Suggested Homicide Statute for Kentucky, 41 Ky. LJ. 139,
149-50 (1952).
34 258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W.2d 893 (1935).3 5 Martin v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1962); Simpson v. Com-
monwealth, 293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W.2d 869 (1943); Marion v. Commonwealth,
269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W.2d 721 (1937).
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one accomplice to the robbery. And, most significantly, the act
directly resulting in homicide was committed in each instance
by a felony participant other than the accused in the murder
case. Because of this combination of circumstances, it was not
possible to convict these defendants of "intentional" murder or
"negligent" murder. For convictions of this offense (murder),
it was necessary to transfer intent and malice from the robberies
to the homicides, a procedure that was described as follows:
Although the accused may not have had the intention of
taking a life, malice in respect to such homicide may be
implied or inferred on the ground that the killing was done
while the person who did the act was engaged in the com-
mission of some other felony or in an attempt to perpetrate
some offense of that grade. 'The turpitude of the act con-
templated is by implication of law transferred to the homicide
which actually is committed so as to make the latter offense
a killing with malice, contrary to the real fact of the case
as it appears in evidence.3
Elimination of the felony murder doctrine as an independent
basis for a conviction of murder does not mean that conduct like
that of the last three cases can never constitute murder. It means
only that such conduct does not automatically constitute murder.
If an accused's participation in a violent felony is deemed from
all of the surrounding circumstances to constitute "recklessness
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life," he can be
convicted of murder even though the homicide results "unin-
tentionally" or at the hands of an accomplice. This result would
follow not because a death occurred during the commission of
a violent crime but rather because the defendant's mental state in
reference to that death is sufficiently culpable to warrant impo-
sition of the most severe penal sanctions available in the law of
homicide. As stated by the drafters of the Model Penal Code,
"[T]he result may not differ often under such a formulation from
that which would be reached under the present rule. But what
is more important is that a conviction on this basis rests upon
sound ground."3 7
3
6Tarrence v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.2d 40, 50-51 (Ky. 1953), quoting
26 AM. JR. Homicide §§ 188, 309 (1940).3 7
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment 4 at 39 (Tent. Draft No. 9 1959).
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C. Voluntary Manslaughter
This offense has generally been described as "an intentional
homicide committed in a sudden rage of passion engendered by
adequate provocation and not the result of malice conceived
before the provocation."38 With no significant changes in sub-
stance the offense has been defined in this state as an intentional
killing in sudden affray or in sudden heat of passion and upon
provocation ordinarily calculated to excite passion beyond con-
trol.3 9 Following is an additional description of these elements
by the Court of Appeals:
As the degree of passion engendered must be such as
would cause the ordinary man of fair, average disposition
to act rashly, so must the provocation be of a character that
would have created that passion in a man of ordinary and
average disposition. The law does not exact of us the cool,
sedate, and deliberate mien of some men. Neither does it
sanction or permit us to act as does the unusually excitable,
impulsive, or rash man. We are all to be measured and
judged by what the average, ordinary man does under
similar circumstances.
40
Following the lead of the Model Penal Code,41 most modem
statutes42 have made substantial changes in the definition of
this crime. The most signicant has been an abandonment of the
requirement that a homicide occur "in sudden heat of passion
upon adequate provocation" in favor of a more liberal, more
flexible concept phrased in this language: "under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse."43 The obvious purpose of this change
is to broaden the circumstances which serve to mitigate homi-
3
8 R. PEma .Ts, supra note 26, at 42.
89 E.g., Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52, 111 S.W.2d 445 (1937);
Hanna v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 584, 46 S.W.2d 1098 (1932); Miller v. Com-
monwealth, 163 Ky. 246, 173 S.W. 761 (1915); Massie v. Commonwealth, 15
Ky. L. Rptr. 562, 24 S.W. 611 (1894).4
0 McHargue v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 82, 88, 21 S.W.2d 115, 117-18
(1929).41 MOD EL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962).4 2 E.g., ILL. CRnI. CODE § (Smith-Hurd 1964); NEW Yonx PmAL LAW §
125.20 (McKinney's 1967); PROPOSED DEL. CrW. CODE §§ 411, 414 (Governor's
Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law, 1967); PRoPosED MicH. REv. Cpanm.
CODE § 2005 (special Committee of Michigan State Bar for the Revision of the
Criminal Code, 1967).4 3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1962).
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cides committed intentionally. With the substituted concept,
mitigating circumstances are not restricted to those which con-
stitute provocation "in the ordinary meaning of the term, i.e., an
injury, injustice or affront perpetrated by the deceased upon the
actor."44 In others words, it is possible for any event, including
mere words, to arouse an extreme mental or emotional disturb-
ance sufficient in nature and degree to reduce murder to man-
slaughter. A second important change accomplished by modem
statutes is the addition of a subjective element to the test for
determining the mitigation issue. As indicated above, the stand-
ard of measurement is still an objective one, i.e., is there a
"reasonable explanation or excuse" for the mental or emotional
disturbance? But in making that determination, triers of fact
are required to place themselves in a defendant's position as he
believed it to be at the time of his act. This is intended to lib-
eralize the common law requirement that "the provocation must
be of a nature calculated to inflame the passions of the ordin-
ary reasonable man."45
Of importance at least equal to these changes in descriptive
language is a change in general direction that is reflected in the
modem approach to this offense. Past efforts with this crime
have been directed toward developing categories of particular
types of provocation that suffice to mitigate. Modem efforts have
been directed toward the development of a flexible standard
for assessing mitigating circumstances, with an accompanying
acknowledgement that the responsibility for deciding this issue
must be left largely for the jury. Justification for this approach
was put this way by the drafters of the Model Penal Code:
There will be room for argument as to the reasonableness
of the explanations or excuses offered; we think again that
argument is needed in these terms. The question, in the end
will be whether the actor's loss of self-control can be under-
stood in terms that arouse sympathy enough to call for miti-
gation in the sentence. That seems to us the issue to be
faced.46
44 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, Comment 5 at 46 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
45R. PmmxNs, supra note 26, at 44.46 MODE. PENAL CODE § 201.3, Comment 5 at 48 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
(Emphasis added)
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D. Involuntary Manslaughter and Negligent Homicide
For many years, the offense of involuntary manslaughter
was a common law misdemeanor in Kentucky, 7 undefined by
statute and committed through conduct of no greater culpability
than ordinary civil negligence. The mens rea was labeled as
"carelessness" or "negligence" and defined in this way:
The words "carelessly" and "negligently" mean the ab-
sence of ordinary care, and "ordinary care" means such care
as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise for his own
protection, under circumstances similar to those described
in this case.48
In 1951 the Court of Appeals changed its position on this point,
expressly overruled prior decisions, and held that an accused
could not be convicted of involuntary manslaughter (still an
undefined misdemeanor) unless his conduct constituted "gross
negligence, " 4' defined by the Court as a "failure to exercise slight
care."50 Shortly after this decision, and apparently in response
to it, the Kentucky legislature enacted KRS 435.025, which
created the offense of homicide through negligent operation
of a motor vehicle. As interpreted by the Court of Appeals, this
statute served to reinstate, in part, "ordinary negligence" as the
culpable mental state for involuntary manslaughter."1 Thus, fol-
lowing its enactment, Kentucky had two types of involuntary
manslaughter, one of which was a common law crime based
upon gross negligence and the other a statutory offense based
upon ordinary negligence. The latter could be committed only
when the death-causing instrumentality happened to be a motor
vehicle.
At this point in history, common law involuntary man-
slaughter was codified through enactment of the following
statute:
KRS 435.022: (1) Any person who causes the death of
a human being by an act creating such extreme risk of death
47 See Held v. Commonwealth, 183 Ky. 209, 208 S.W. 772 (1919); Speaks
v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 393, 149 S.W. 850 (1912).48 Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 361, 281 S.W. 164, 167 (1926).49 Mayre v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
50 Id. at 855.
51 Kelly v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 536 (Ky. 1954).
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or great bodily injury as to manifest a wanton indifference to
the value of human life according to the standard of con-
duct of a reasonable man under the circumstances shall be
guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree and
shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than one
nor more than fifteen years.
(2) Any person who causes the death of a human being
by reckless conduct according to the standard of conduct of
a reasonable man under the circumstances shall be guilty of
involuntary manslaughter in the second degree and shall be
imprisoned in the county jail for a term not exceeding twelve
months or fined a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars
or both.
With the division of this offense into degrees, it was neces-
sary for the Court of Appeals to distinguish between the two
types of death-causing conduct described in the enactment. Al-
though the two significant terms, "wanton " and "reckless," at
one time had been interpreted as legal equivalents,52 the Court
provided the following distinction:
A wanton act is a wrongful act done on purpose in com-
plete disregard of the rights of others. The actor must have
conscious knowledge of the probable consequences and a
complete disregard for them. Reckless conduct displays an
indifference to the rights of others and an indifference as to
whether wrong or injury will result from the act done. Reck-
lessness involves thoughtlessness while wanton conduct in-
volves actual knowledge of the probable results and com-
plete disregard for those results.53
With these definitions the law of involuntary manslaughter, as it
presently exists, was finalized, and may be summarized as
follows:
1. Unintentional deaths resulting from what was previously
called "reckless and wanton" conduct, and previously treated as
"negligent murder" or "negligent voluntary manslaughter," are
now treated as involuntary manslaughter in the first degree
52 Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 164 (1926). "[Tihe words
reckless' and 'wanton mean utterly careless, having no regard for consequences
or for the safety of others, yet without malice." Id. at 361, 281 S.W. at 167.5 3 Lambert v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Ky. 1964); accord, Smith
v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1968).
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(penalty of from one to fifteen years). "Wantonness" is designated
as the culpable mental state for this offense.
2. Unintentional deaths resulting from what was previously
called "gross negligence," and treated as common law involun-
tary manslaughter, are now treated as involuntary manslaughter
in the second degree (penalty of one year in jail, $500 fine, or
both), with the requisite type of conduct now being entitled
"recklessness."
3. Unintentional deaths resulting from the negligent oper-
ation of a motor vehicle, the requisite type of conduct being
"ordinary negligence," constitutes an offense under KRS 435.025
(penalty of one year in jail).
4. Unintentional deaths resulting from "ordinary negligence"
not involving the use of a motor vehicle cannot be the subject
matter of a criminal homicide.
To focus upon the problems with these offenses (involuntary
manslaughter and negligent homicide) reference is made once
again to the approach taken by modem codes. Their most
significant achievement has been elimination of the confusion
that has resulted from the use of such terns as "wanton," "reck-
less," "careless," "gross negligence" and "ordinary negligence."
The culpable mental states for "unintentional" homicide offenses
have been reduced to only two, "recklessness" and "criminal neg-
ligence," and have been fully and uniformly defined in all of
the codes:
"Recklessly." A person acts recklessly with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining
an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or
that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature
and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation....
"Criminal negligence." A person acts with criminal negli-
gence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described
by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or
that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
[Vol. 58
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deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation.
54
As indicated by these definitions, neither "recklessness" nor
"criminal negligence" may be used to impose criminal sanc-
tions for homicide unless the following elements are shown to
exist: (a) A substantial and unjustifiable risk that death is likely
to result from the conduct in issue; and (b) a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation. Once these two elements are established,
the conduct in issue constitutes "recklessness" if the actor is aware
of the risk and consciously disregards it, or "criminal negli-
gence" if he fails to perceive the risk. In other words, reckless
conduct involves a state of awareness while criminally negligent
conduct involves the creation of risk inadvertently. The adop-
tion of these definitions for use in describing "unintentional"
homicide offenses would substantially improve this aspect of
existing homicide law.
In addition to matters of description and definition, two
significant differences in substance exist between Kentucky's
approach to "unintentionar' homicide and the approach reflected
in modem revisions. The first involves "unintentionar' homicide
of the highest degree. As indicated above, conduct that
previously constituted "negligent murder" in Kentucky (e.g.,
shooting into a crowd, an occupied building, or an occupied
automobile) is now treated as involuntary manslaughter in the
first degree. In every statute that has been enacted or proposed
since the Model Penal Code, such conduct has been equated
with "intentional" homicides and punished as murder.5 5 The
second substantive difference involves the lowest degree of
"cunintentional' homicide. In Kentucky criminal sanctions
are imposed for a death resulting from the negligent oper-
ation of a motor vehicle. All of the modem revisions have made
two changes in this offense, as it is defined and applied in this
state. None has limited its application to vehicular deaths, on the
5 4 NEW YORK PENAL i.AW § 15.05 (McKinney's 1967); accord, ILL. CIrM.
CODE § 4-6, 4-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962); PnOPosED
DEL. CamM. CODE § 100 (Governor's Committee for the Revision of the Criminal
Law, 1967); PRoposED MicH. REv. Cram. CODE § 305 (Special Committee of the
Michigan State Bar for the Revision of the Criminal Law, 1967).
55 See note 24 supra.
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theory that such a limitation creates a distinction without a
reason.56 What rationale can possibly exist for distinguishing be-
tween a homicide that results from the negligent use of a vehicle
and one that results from the negligent use of a weapon? In
addition, none of the modem statutes allows for the imposition
of criminal sanctions on the basis of "ordinary negligence":
His [the negligent offender's] culpability, though obviously
less than that of the reckless offender, is appreciably greater
than that required for ordinary civil negligence by virtue of
the "substantial and unjustifiable" character of the risk in-
volved and the factor of "gross deviation" from the ordinary
standard of care.
57
Elimination of this culpable mental state as a basis of criminality
reflects these judgments: (a) that in the absence of moral fault
the only reason for imposing punitive sanctions is to influence
individual conduct; and (b) that the "ordinarily" inadvertent
actor cannot be influenced by threatened sanctions.
H. ASSAULT
A. Introduction
Common law assault is usually defined as "(1) an attempt
to commit a battery, or (2) an unlawful act which places an-
other in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate bat-
tery." 58 Kentucky's definition of the offense is not very different.
It may be committed through an attempt to commit a battery:
An assault is an attempt, or effort with force and violence
to do a corporal hurt to another, by striking at him in strik-
ing distance, with or without a weapon, though the party
striking misses his aim.59
And it may be committed through conduct which places another
in reasonable apprehension of immediate harm:
56 See MODzL PErAL CODE § 201.4, Comment 2 at 55 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
57NEw YoPx PENAL LAW § 15.05, Commentary 23 (McKinney's 1967).58 R. PxwuNs, supra note 26, at 86.
59 Commonwealth v. Remley, 257 Ky. 209, 210, 77 S.W.2d 784 (1934),
quoting J. ROBmESON, CmlmNAL LAW AND PnocEIuRE § (2d Ed. 1927).
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An assault is an unlawful offer of corporal injury to an-
other by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person
of another, under such circumstances as create a well-founded
fear of immediate peril.60
Through the years this offense has been relatively free of
difficulty, except for a problem that may be demonstrated by use
of the following hypothetical situation: D, with an unloaded
weapon which he knows to be unloaded, points toward V in a
threatening manner. V, not knowing the condition of the weapon,
reasonably believes himself to be in danger of immediate harm.
Intent on the part of D and reasonable apprehension of immedi-
ate physical injury by V are present. Thus, simple assault, as
defined above, has been committed. But in some of the more
recent cases, the Court of Appeals has added to the offense a
requirement that the offer of violence occur under circumstances
which "denote at the time an intention to do it coupled with the
present ability to carry such intention into effect."6' (Emphasis
added.) With this requirement added, D's conduct does not
constitute common law assault, a result that is inconsistent with
the reason for the offense. The pain and anxiety of a victim that
result from an apparent ability to inflict harm are indistinguish-
able from the pain and anxiety that result from an actual ability
to inflict harm. In recognition of this inconsistency, all of the
modern statutes have eliminated "present ability" as an element
of this offense.
62
In the discussion which follows, "assault," as a criminal law
concept, is given a meaning considerably broader than that
enunciated in the preceding paragraphs. Consistent with most
modern statutes, the term is used to represent all offenses in-
volving the infliction of actual physical injury upon the person
of another. Used in this sense, assault becomes a companion of
homicide since both are so-called "result" offenses. Bodily in-
jury is the prohibited result of the former and death is the
prohibited result of the latter. A revision of assault to provide
for all circumstances in which bodily injury may be criminally
60 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 247 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Ky. 1952).61 May v. Commonwealth. 285 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Ky. 1955).62E.g., ILL. CMM. CODE § 12.1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Nrw YORK PENA LAw
§120.15 (McKinneys 1967).
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inflicted upon another must start with an analysis of the fol-
lowing existing offenses:
1. Common law battery (twelve months in jail and $5000
fine).
2. KRS 435.170(1)-Malicious and willful shooting and
wounding with intent to kill (two to twenty-one years).
3. KRS 435.170(2)-Malicious and willful cutting, striking
or stabbing with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
(two to twenty-one years).
4. KRS 435.170(3)-Malicious and willful administering of
poison to another who does not die (two to twenty-one
years).
5. KRS 435.180-Shooting, wounding or cutting in sudden
affray or heat and passion, without previous malice (six
to twelve months in jail and $500 fine).
6. KRS 435.190(2)-Reckless shooting or throwing of missile
into train, station, steamboat or motor vehicle (one to five
years).
The crimes that are defined by this law overabound with in-
equities. Most have resulted from inadequate legislative defi-
nitions and from a failure to grade bodily injury offenses in
accordance with some rational principle. Elimination of these
inequities must be the principal objective of a revision of the
law of assault.
B. Common Law Battery
This offense is usually defined as "the unlawful application
of force to the person of another." 3 No significant change has
been made in this definition by the Kentucky Court of Appeals:
"[A] battery is any unlawful touching of the person of another,
either by the aggressor himself or by any substance set in motion
by him."" In discussing the types of force that are "unlawful"
within this definition, it is necessary to distinguish between "in-
tentionar' force and "unintentional" force, a distinction not unlike
that which exists in the law of homicide. As to the first type, the
Court of Appeals has declared that such force constitutes the
63 R. Pmuxnrs, supra note 26, at 80.64 Senters v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Ky. 1955).
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offense of battery if inflicted with "a hostile intent,"65 with
"malice,"6 6 or with "il will."6 7 On other occasions, however, the
Court has said that the offense may be committed "upon the
spur of the moment, without previous malice and without pre-
vious purpose so to do."68 On still other occasions, the Court
has stated that malice is a requirement of battery but that it
"may be presumed from the very nature of the act."(9 Upon
careful analysis it becomes quite clear that these declarations
constitute nothing more than a complicated statement of a
simple principle, namely, that force resulting from a conscious
objective or purpose of an actor is "unlawful" within the com-
mon law definition of battery. The problems that exist with this
offense are identical to those that exist with "intentional" murder.
Their solution is also identical. References to such terms as "hos-
tile intent," "malice" and "ill will" should be eliminated and
the triers of fact left to decide only whether an accused con-
sciously desired to inflict bodily injury upon his victim.
In addition to "intentionar' applications of force, common law
battery under existing law prohibits certain unintentionally in-
flicted force. One of the most significant cases involving "unin-
tentionar' battery is Senters v. Commonwealth.70 In this case,
evidence indicated that the victims of an alleged offense were
walking alongside a highway at night a few feet off the pave-
ment. Without seeing or hearing the defendant's approach, they
were struck by his automobile and injured. On earlier occasions
the Court of Appeals had treated conduct such as this as common
law battery by reasoning that the requisite intent for the offense
could be inferred from the willful doing of a reckless act.71 In
the Senters case, the Court took a more direct approach by ruling
that the offense can be committed through an act of gross negli-
gence, defined by the Court as a "failure to exercise slight care
under the circumstances." 72 Unlike homicide, common law bat-
tery is an offense of only one degree. Consequently, no need
0 5Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1955).
60 Sigler v. Ralph, 417 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ky. 1967); Senters v. Common-
wealth, 275 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Ky. 1955).
67 Senters v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Ky. 1955).
68 Urban v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 770, 775, 245 S.W. 511, 513 (1922).
69 Senters v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Ky. 1955).
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Lyons v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 657, 197 S.W. 387 (1917).
72 275 S.W.2d at 788 (Ky. 1955).
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has existed for a distinction between acts that may be character-
ized as "wanton or reckless" and those that may be character-
ized as "grossly negligent." The decision in Senters that acts of
the latter type are sufficient for an offense of battery necessarily
means that acts of the former type, possessing a greater degree
of criminal culpability, are also sufficient for the offense.
7 3 It
would seem to mean, in addition, that "ordinary negligence" in
the civil law sense is insufficient.
The greatest fault with "unintentional" battery under existing
law is the absence of any basis for grading an offender's conduct
in accordance with the potential dangerousness of his act and
the extent of actual bodily harm caused. No distinction is made,
for example, between the criminality of an offender who "reck-
lessly" shoots into a crowd and causes serious physical injury
and one who drives an automobile with "gross-negligence" and
causes only slight injury. Despite significant differences in their
mental state and the consequences of their acts, both offenders
are guilty of the same offense and punishable potentially to the
same extent. In revising the law of assault, modem statutes have
eliminated this defect by dividing the offense of assault (mean-
ing by this bodily injury crime) into degrees and grading the
criminality of "unintentional" conduct according to the culpable
mental state of the actor and the seriousness of the injury he
causes.74 If the culpable mental state is "extreme recklessness"
and the injury great, the degree of assault will be high and the
punishment severe; if the culpable mental state is "criminal
negligence" and the injury slight, the degree will be low and the
punishment lenient. To make distinctions such as these in the
73 In a later case, Bentley v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1962),
the Court of Appeals declared that "a shooting and wounding through either
gross negligence or recklessness and wanton conduct ...is an assault and bat-
tery." Id. at 496.
74 The New York statutes on assault have had the greatest influence. In
these statutes "unintentional" assault is broken down into three degrees. The first
degree is committed when a defendant causes a "serious physical injury" through
conduct constituting "extreme recklessness;" the second degree is committed when
a "serious physical injury" is caused "recklessly" by means of a deadly weapon
or dangerous weapon; and the third degree is committed when "physical injury"
is caused "recklessly" or through "criminal negligence" by use of a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument. NEw YoRK PENAL LAW §§ 120.00-120.10 (McKinney's
1967). Delaware and Michigan, in their proposed codes, have adopted the New
York approach to this offense. See PaoposED DEL. CiMM. CODE §§ 404-406 (Cov-
ernor's Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law, 1967); PaoposED Micir. RBV.
Crunm. CODE §§ 2101-2103 (Special Committee of the Michigan State Bar for the
Revision of the Criminal Law, 1967).
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law of homicide, as we do in this state, but not in the law of
assault is indefensible. The major objectives of the two classi-
fications of crime are not significantly different. One seeks to
inhibit the infliction of death upon human beings, the other seeks
to inhibit the infliction of bodily injury.
C. KRS 435.170(l)
Any person shall be confined in the peniteniary for not less
than two nor more than twenty-one years who:
(1) Willfully and maliciously... shoots at another without
wounding him, or shoots at and wounds another with intent
to kill him so that he does not die from the wound, or wounds
a person other than the person shot at so that he does not
die from the wound.
The conduct prohibited by this provision was previously
punishable as common law battery or attempted murder, both of
which have identical sanctions (a maximum jail sentence of
twelve months, five thousand dollars fine, or both)." A desire
to provide penalties more appropriate to the seriousness of such
conduct stimulated the creation of this statutory offense. In
satisfying its objective, the legislature managed to provide ad-
ditional confusion and difficulty to the already confused and
difficult doctrine of mens rea. Mentioned as apparently distinctive
elements of this offense are three culpable mental states, "will-
fully," "maliciously," and "intent to kill." As defined by the Court
of Appeals, the first (willfulness) means intentionally, not acci-
dentally, and the second (malice), a synonym for "malice afore-
thought," means a predetermination to do an act, with the sud-
denness of the predetermination being insignificant. 6 The third
(intent to kill) means a conscious desire to cause the death of
another. The relationship of the three has been explained by
the Court of Appeals as follows:
[T]he words 'with intention to kill him' modify only the
words 'shoot at and wound another,' and do not modify
or refer in any way to the words 'shoot at another without
wounding. In other words, the statute creates two offenses;
75 KRS 431.075 (1950).
76 Combs v. Commonwealth, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 1058, 1060, 112 S.W. 658, 660
(1908).
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one of willfully and maliciously shooting at another without
wounding, in which case the intent to kill is not a part of the
offense, and the other of shooting at and wounding another
with intention to kill him, in which event the intent to kill
is an essential element of the crime.71
As a consequence of this interpretation, a number of in-
equities are possible. For example, the same criminal sanctions
(two to twenty-one years imprisonment) are provided for the
situations which follow, although criminal culpability of the
two offenders differs tremendously:
D-1 shoots at V-1 with intent D-2 shoots at V-2 with intent
to kill. The bullet strikes V-1 vs. to hit his foot, completely
in the head and causes seri- misses and causes no injury.
ous injury.
An even more interesting comparison can be made between the
conduct of D-2 and that contained in the following hypothetical:
D-3, intending to injure but not kill, shoots at V-3 and causes
an injury from which V-3 dies.
As indicated in the first part of this article, D-3's conduct vio-
lates a special homicide statute78 and is punishable to the extent
of imprisonment for a period of one to six years. This means that
if D-2, rather than missing his target and causing no injury, had
shot his victim and caused death, his potential sanction would
have been reduced from two-to-twenty-one years to one-to-six
years, a result having a well-concealed rationale. Additional in-
equities are possible under this statute because of its restricted
application to the act of "shooting a gun." For example, the
following situation is not statutorily prohibited and would have
to be treated as attempted murder or common law battery:
D-4 plants a bomb in V-4s automobile with intent to kill
him. The bomb explodes, does not cause the death of V-4,
but causes serious physical injury.
In every significant way this conduct is indistinguishable from
that of D-1 above. Because of the shortcomings of the statute,
77 Keys v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 465, 467, 86 S.W.2d 121, 121-22 (1935).
78 KRS 435.050 (1942).
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however, the two offenders must receive substantially different
treatment under the criminal law.
The major problem with this statute is that it attempts to
use a single criminal offense to deal with several significantly
different types of deviant behavior. A revision of assault must be
directed toward elimination of this problem. Specifically, two
substantial changes should be made. First, the offense of assault
should be treated exclusively as a "result" offense, its essential
element consisting of bodily injury to another person. Acts of
violence directed toward another but not causing injury should
be treated separately.79 Secondly, all acts performed with in-
tent to cause death, even if injury results, should be excluded
from the "assault" provisions and treated as a part of the law of
"criminal attempt to commit crime." 0 By doing this, every act
committed with an intention of causing death, without regard to
whether or not bodily injury has resulted, can be prosecuted as
attempted murded and sanctioned in accordance with the ex-
treme dangerousness of character reflected by such intent.
D. KRS 435.170(2) and (3)
Any person shall be confined in the penitentiary for not
less than two nor more than twenty-one years who:
(2) Willfully and maliciously cuts, strikes, or stabs an-
other with a knife or other deadly weapon with intent to
kill, if the person stabbed, cut or bruised does not die from
the wound; or
(3) Willfully and maliciously administers poison to an-
other, if the person poisoned does not die from the poisoning.
The reason for enactment of these provisions is identical to
that which stimulated the immediately preceding one: "By this
79 "Since actual 'physical injury' is a requisite of assault, and the crime is not
established by an unsuccessful attempt to cause such, the crime of attempted as-
sault becomes a meaningful one, at least with respect to the intentional forms of
assault. For example, one who with intent to cause serious physical injury swipes
at another with a knife is guilty of first degree assault if he succeeds . . . but
only of an attempt to commit that crime if he fails." NEw YoRK PENAL LAw, Art.
120, Practice Commentary at 194 (McKinney's 1967).
80 "Assaults will be treated as attempts.... This creates no problem in the
case of aggravated assaults, such, for example, as assaults with intent to kill,
rape or rob. They will be dealt with as attempted murder, attempted rape, or
attempted robbery, or as bodily injury (crime] where such occurs. It will be clear
under the attempt Section of the Code that, as most courts now agree, an assault
with intent to commit a crime amounts to an attempt to commit the crime."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.10, Comment 82 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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statute, the common law misdemeanor of assault and battery is
made a felony where it is accompanied by an intent to kill, but
not otherwise."8' Most of the problems that exist with the "shoot-
ing assault" exist with the offenses defined by these provisions.
The most serious is this: A serious bodily injury inflicted with
a knife, and with an intent to kill, carries a major penalty of
twenty-one years imprisonment. The same injury inflicted with
the same intent but by some means other than a "knife or other
deadly weapon" constitutes common law battery or attempted
murder. As stated above, both of the latter are punishable by im-
prisonment for a period not to exceed twelve months. As a con-
sequence of this statutory restriction, the Court of Appeals, on
numerous occasions, has treated assault with intent to kill as
common law battery because the instrumentalities used to in-
flict injury happened to be fists, hands, or feet, none of which
has been held to constitute a "deadly weapon." 2
As indicated in the preceding section, conduct that is ac-
companied by an intention to kill, i.e., a conscious desire to cause
death, indicates something significant to the criminal law about
the person engaging in that conduct. Without regard to the oc-
currence or non-occurrence of injury and without regard to the
instrumentality used by such person, his intention indicates an
immediate need for the rehabilitative services of the correction
system. To satisfy this need and, at the same time, minimize the
possibility of inequitable treatment of offenders, it is essential
that the offense of attempted murder be segregated from offenses
involving bodily injury and that it be defined so that an offender's
state of mind becomes the critical issue.
E. KRS 485.180
Any person who ... in a sudden affray or in sudden heat
and passion, without previous malice ...shoots at with-
out wounding, or shoots and wounds another person, or
wounds a person other than the person shot at, . . . or, in
like manner, cuts, thrusts or stabs any other person with a
knife or other deadly weapon, without killing that person,
81 Helton v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Ky. 1951).
82 E.g., Charles v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1959); Crubaugh
v. Commonwealth, 259 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. 1953); Reed v. Commonwealth, 248
S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1952).
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shall be fined not.., more than five hundred dollars, or im-
prisoned for not less than six nor more than twelve months,
or both.
The purpose of this statute is to provide in the law of assault
the same mitigating factor that exists in the law of homicide.
It applies only to "intentional" bodily injury offenses and then
only to the extent of reducing sanctions. The language used to
describe the mitigating factor is almost identical to that used
by the Court of Appeals to describe mitigation for voluntary
manslaughter. s3 Like the preceding ones, this offense has a major
weakness that results from a legislative limitation upon its appli-
cation having no real significance to a description of the offense.
When this statute is construed in light of a companion statute,
KRS 435.170, it is apparent that the former was enacted to
provide mitigation for the offense created by the latter, which
includes assaults resulting from "shooting," "wounding," "stab-
bing" and "striking." In drafting the mitigation statute, however,
the legislature limited its application to assaults involving "shoot-
ing," "cutting," thrusting" and "stabbing."
Because of the difference in this language, several indefensible
decisions have been made. For example, in one case the offender
had injured his victim by striking him with a poker and with
large blocks of coal. Charged with willful and malicious striking
and wounding with intent to kill, he sought an instruction under
KRS 435.180 for mitigation of the offense. In affirming a refusal
of the instruction, the Court of Appeals stated that:
The word "strike" appearing in KRS 435.170(2) is not in-
cluded in KRS 435.180. Therefore the latter section does not
cover the lower degree of the offense of striking with a deadly
weapon with an intent to kill.84
A similar decision was made in a case in which the bodily injury
was inflicted by use of a tobacco hook 5 and in another in which
the injury was inflicted by use of a club. 6 The defect reflected
by these cases can be eliminated by making the availability of
mitigation dependent upon the state of mind of an offender
83 See text at notes 38-46, supra.
4 Reed v. Commonwealth 248 S.W.2d 911, 1913 (Ky. 1952).
85 Burgess v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 326, 195 S.W. 445 (1917).86 Cruise v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 831, 11 S.W.2d 925 (1928).
KENTUcKY LAW Joun eCAL
rather than upon the means by which he causes bodily injury.
If he causes an injury intentionally and can establish that he acted
under the influence of an "extreme emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse," he should be
entitled to the benefit of mitigation.sT
F. KRS 485.190
(1) Any person who recklessly throws a stone or other
missile at or into, or shoots at or into, any railroad engine or
cars attached to the engine, passenger coach, any station or
station platform occupied by any person, at or into any motor
vehicle, stationary or traveling upon any public highway in
this state, shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor
more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not less
than six nor more than twelve months.
(2) If the missile thrown or the shot fired was calculated to
produce death or great bodily harm, and any person on or
in the engine, cars, coach, station, station platform or motor
vehicle is injured or wounded the person so throwing or
shooting shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less
than one nor more than five years....
In the limited situations described in this statute, the legis-
lature has created a statutory battery based upon "reckless con-
duct calculated to produce death or great bodily harm." With
such conduct sufficient for common law battery, the legislature's
purpose in creating the offense was again to provide for a
greater penalty than is otherwise available. The difficulty en-
countered by the courts with this statute has involved another
statute, KRS 435.170(4), which creates the "greater offense" of
"willfully and maliciously" throwing a missile or shooting at or
into the very same structures mentioned in the quoted statute.18
S8 The same reasons that exist in the law of homicide for liberalizing the
standard of measurement for the adequacy of mitigating circumstances also exist
in the law of assault. A discussion of the standard used in modern statutes is
contained in an earlier part of this article.
8s KRS 435.170(4) (1942) provides as follows:
Any person shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than two
nor more than twenty-one years who:
(4) Willfully and maliciously shoots at or into, or throws a stone or
dangerous or deadly missile at or into, any railroad engine or cars at-
tached to the engie, passenger coach, station, station platform, steam-
boat or motor vehicle occupied by any person, or any dwelling house,
storehouse or any building where people live or frequent for pleasure
or business. ...
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Despite the fact that physical injury to another is not a require-
ment for its commission, the latter supports greater sanctions
than the former, two-to-twenty-one years as compared with one-
to-five years. Justification for this difference must be found, if
at all, in the apparent distinction that exists between the mens rea
requirements of the two statutes, "willfully and maliciously" for
one and "recklessly but calculated to produce death or great
bodily harm" for the other.
On the surface a substantial difference between these two
mental states seems to exist. Willfulness and maliciousness con-
note "intentional" conduct, while recklessness connotes "unin-
tentional" conduct. But a careful analysis of the cases applying
these two statutes reveals rather pointedly that the distinction
between the two is more apparent than real. Two very similar
cases serve to demonstrate. In the first,"9 the accused had thrown
a bottle at an occupied automobile. The bottle struck the vehicle
without causing injury to any of its occupants. He was prose-
cuted for the "greater offense" of willfully and maliciously throw-
ing a missile at an occupied vehicle. In the second case,90 the
defendant's act was virtually identical to that of the first, at least
in so far as criminal culpability is concerned. While in one car
and being chased by the police in another, he threw a block of
wood into the highway. The police car wrecked and one of its
occupants was injured. The defendant was tried for the "lesser
offense" of "recklessly causing an injury by throwing a missile at
an occupied motor vehicle." The Court of Appeals approved
both prosecutions, apparently by looking at the conduct of the
two defendants from different viewpoints. The first defendant's
mental state was viewed with respect to his act and found to be
willful and malicious. The second defendant's state of mind
was viewed with respect to the consequences of his act and found
to constitute recklessness. By ignoring the injury which resulted
in the second case and viewing the defendant's state of mind in
relation to his act, he too could have been convicted of the "great-
er offense" of willfully and maliciously throwing at a vehicle.
The irrationality of this can be more vividly demonstrated
hypothetically: D, having no intention to kill or cause injury,
89 Harrison v. Commonwealth. 373 S.W.2d 156 (Ky. 1963).
00 Cook v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1966).
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but fully aware of the risk thereof, consciously shoots into an
occupied automobile and causes serious injury to an occupant.
His conduct is violative of KRS 190(2) and punishable to the
extent of five years imprisonment. At the same time, if the occu-
pant's injury is ignored, the defendant's conduct also violates
KRS 435.170(4). Under this statute, it is punishable to the extent
of twenty-one years imprisonment, certainly a discordant result.
Remedy of this situation, more typical than atypical in the Ken-
tucky statutes, requires two general changes of direction. First of
all the host of largely undefined mental states used throughout
the statutes should be eliminated and replaced with a few mental
states, fully and carefully defined by the legislature. Secondly,
all criminal offenses should be defined by use of principles having
general application.
